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The susceptibility of digital signatures to
fraud in the National Electronic
Conveyancing System: An analysis
Rouhshi Low* and Ernest Foo†
Public key cryptography, and with it, the ability to compute digital signatures,
have made it possible for electronic commerce to flourish. It is thus
unsurprising that the proposed Australian NECS will also utilise digital
signatures in its system so as to provide a fully automated process from the
creation of electronic land title instrument to the digital signing, and
electronic lodgment of these instruments. This necessitates an analysis of
the fraud risks raised by the usage of digital signatures because a
compromise of the integrity of digital signatures will lead to a compromise of
the Torrens system itself. This article will show that digital signatures may in
fact offer greater security against fraud than handwritten signatures; but to
achieve this, digital signatures require an infrastructure whereby each
component is properly implemented and managed.
1 Introduction
There has been increasing interest from the Australian Government in the
development of the National Electronic Conveyancing System (NECS). At the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting in 2008, COAG
supported the development of an electronic conveyancing system which will
provide ‘an efficient national platform to settle lodge instruments with land
registries and meet associated duty and tax obligations electronically through
a national system’.1 Similar support has also been expressed by the Standing
Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG).2
If successfully implemented, it would mean certain changes to current
conveyancing practices. One of these changes is the introduction of digital
signatures for the purposes of executing electronic land title instruments.
Digital signatures are used to replace handwritten signatures because they
offer the same assurances as handwritten signatures of integrity and
non-repudiation that are necessary in land transactions.
But digital signatures are not the same as handwritten signatures in that they
are generated using a cryptographic mechanism as opposed to simply putting
a mark on paper. The use of digital signatures also requires the implementation
* Lecturer, School of Accountancy, Queensland University of Technology. Email:
<r.low@qut.edu.au>. Sincere thanks for Mark Burdon, Lynden Griggs and Simon Libbis for
their comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
† Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Science and Technology, Queensland University of Technology.
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1 See COAG, Council of Australian Governments’ Meeting 3 July 2008, at
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-07-03/index.cfm#economy>
(accessed 26 July 2009).
2 See NECS, NECSpress Issue 12 November 2006, at <http://www.necs.gov.au/NECspress-
15-November-2006/default.aspx> (accessed 26 July 2009).
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of various components, such as the use of a Certification Authority (CA) to
manage the keys required for digital signatures, the use of strong algorithms
for the generation of the digital signature, secure storage of the private key, all
of which are not required for handwritten signatures.
This article argues that similar to handwritten signatures, digital signatures
are also susceptible to fraud, such as forgery. The difference is in the manner
in which these fraud risks may materialise for digital signatures because of
these components where each component may be attacked, exposing the
digital signature to fraud. Thus the identification and management of these
risks becomes important, so that all stakeholders using the NECS can be
assured of the integrity of digital signatures and, in turn, the continued
integrity of the Torrens system. The aim of this article is to discuss the
vulnerabilities of each component to fraudulent attacks, how these may be
managed, and the regulatory and compliance issues arising from this. This
discussion will show that digital signatures may in fact offer greater security
against fraud than handwritten signatures; but to achieve this, and this is the
crux of using digital signatures, digital signatures require an infrastructure
whereby each component is properly implemented and managed.
2 The National Electronic Conveyancing System
The NECS3 is anAustralia-wide initiative, available to all states and territories
in Australia. Its purpose is to enable the online preparation of land title
instruments and dealings, lodgment of these instruments and electronic
financial settlement.4
The following provides a brief description of how the NECS might
operate.5
It is likely that use of the NECS will be restricted to users who have
established their credentials with the system.6 Users will be categorised into
three broad categories:7 subscribers,8 users9 and certifiers.10 To become
3 The website for the NECS is: <http://www.necs.gov.au/>. Articles on the NECS include
A Perry, ‘Building the Home Page’ (2005) (262) Lawyers Weekly 16; A Davidson, ‘The
National Electronic Conveyancing System’ (2006) 26(1) Proctor 33; and S Drummond,
‘Victorian E-Conveyance Should Go National’ (2005) (267) Lawyers Weekly 10.
4 For more information about how the NECS will work, see NECS, How NECS Will Work,
2005, at <http://www.necs.gov.au/How-NECS-Will-Work/default.aspx> (accessed
14 September 2009).
5 This section is adapted from R Low, ‘From Paper to Electronic: Exploring the Fraud Risks
Stemming from the Use of Technology to Automate the Australian Torrens System’ (2009)
21(2) Bond LR 107.
6 National Electronic Conveyancing Office, ‘Draft Operations Description for a National
Electronic Conveyancing System V.6’, National Electronic Conveyancing Office,
Melbourne, 2007, at [7.3].
7 Ibid, at [4.4].
8 Subscribers are corporations, partnerships, associations, government agencies and natural
persons, employing or contracting industry practitioners, and others meeting the minimum
requirements for representing clients in using the NECS to prepare and/or certify and sign
instruments, information reports and settlement statements. Subscribers are represented by
an authorised officer. An ‘authorised officer’ is a natural person authorised by a corporation,
partnership, association or government agency to represent it as a subscriber. The term
‘client’ means registered proprietors, vendors, purchasers, caveators, mortgagees,
mortgagors and others with interests in land or parties to a transaction in land: ibid, at [4.4].
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registered as a subscriber, the practitioner, or an officer of a business entity
authorised to make the application (the authorised officer), must complete an
online application form and sign it with his or her digital signature
certificate.11 The authorised user can then nominate others to be users of the
system.12
Once access is obtained, the user can log on to NECS to electronically
prepare land title instruments.13 The completed land title instrument is
digitally signed and lodged electronically via NECS for registration. Manual
intervention by staff of the Land Titles Office in examining and processing the
electronic documents lodged will still be required.14
This description shows that implementation of NECS will bring about
changes to current conveyancing practices, such as restricted access,
restricting the ability to digitally sign land title instruments to certifiers,
replacing handwritten signatures with digital signatures, electronic lodgment
and registration and the possible abolishment of the paper certificate of title.15
The focus of this article is on the use of digital signatures and its vulnerability
to fraud. The following section explains what digital signatures are and how
they will be used in the NECS.
3 Digital signatures
3.1 The technology
A digital signature has been defined as ‘appended data or a cryptographic
transformation of a data unit’.16 It is computed using public key cryptography.
Public key cryptography (asymmetric key algorithms or public key
algorithms) was first described by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in
1976. It uses two mathematically related keys (or key pairs) — a public key
that is disclosed and known to everyone and a corresponding private key that
must be kept secret. Even though both keys are mathematically related, given
the public key it is computationally difficult to determine the private key by
simply knowing the public key. The keys must be two large prime numbers.
9 Users are employees or contractors authorised by a subscriber and authorised by that
subscriber to certify and sign settlement statements and information reports on behalf of the
subscriber or the subscriber’s clients: ibid, at [4.4].
10 Certifiers are industry practitioners employed by or contracted to a subscriber and authorized
by that subscriber to certify and sign instruments, settlement statements and information
reports on behalf of the subscriber or the subscriber’s clients: ibid, at [4.4].
11 The manner in which the digital signature certificate may be obtained is discussed further
below.
12 For more on the registration process, see ‘Draft Operations Description’, above n 6,
at [9.1.2.1]–[9.1.2.5].
13 Ibid, at [9.25]–[9.26].
14 NECS, above n 4.
15 For a discussion of these other changes and their implications on fraud, see Low, above n 5
and R Low, ‘Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian National Electronic
Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?’ (2006) 13(2) Murdoch Uni Jnl of Electronic Law
225.
16 Standards Australia, ‘Health Informatics — Public Key Infrastructure Part 1: Framework
and Overview’, AS ISO 17090.1-2003, Standards Australia, Sydney, 2003, at [7.3].
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To digitally sign a document,17 the first step is to use a one way
mathematical function known as a hashing algorithm, to produce a hash (or
number) from the original message. The purpose of the hash function is to
reduce the data from the original message, which can be very large, to a fixed
size. The result is called a message digest.18
Next, the digital signature is generated by using the sender’s private key to
perform a mathematical operation on the hash. The digital signature (coded
hash) is then appended to the message and sent with the message. The
recipient then creates a new summary of the plain text message using the
hashing algorithm that was used in the first stage by the sender. The recipient
also uses the sender’s public key to perform the same mathematical operation
on the coded hash and compares the two. If the two are identical, then the
recipient can be assured that the message was signed using the private key
corresponding to the public key, although this in itself does not prove that the
private key belongs to the sender.19
Usually a public key infrastructure (PKI) is used for the management and
distribution of the keys where a trusted third party is used to perform this
function. The trusted third party is generally called a certification authority
(CA). Its main function is to verify the relationship between the identity of the
sender and the public key of the sender through the issuance of certificates.
The purpose of digital certificates is to guarantee the association between a
public key and its owner. The certificate is issued by the CA after verifying the
identity of the user. It is possible for a single entity (the CA) to be responsible
for both the issuing of the certificates and the verification of identity. However
in some PKI systems, this role is divided between two entities — the CA for
issuing the certificates and the registration authority (RA) for verifying
identity. The certificates contain information such as the owner’s name and the
associated public key. The CA also digitally signs the certificate using its
private key. By digitally signing the certificate, the CA provides an assurance
that the public key contained in the certificate does indeed belong to the
individual named in the certificate and that this person is authorised to use the
private key associated with the public key in the certificate and vouches for the
authenticity of the information contained within the certificate.
Thus in the above steps, if a PKI is used, the recipient would receive the
coded summary together with the plain text of the message, as well a
certificate from the CA. The certificate contains the sender’s public key as
well as the digital signature of the CA. When the recipient receives the coded
summary and the certificate, the recipient can use the CA’s public key to verify
the CA’s signature on the certificate. If that is successful, the recipient can
17 This section is adapted from S Christensen, W Duncan and R Low, Moving Queensland
Property Transactions to the Digital Age: Can Writing and Signature Requirements be
Fulfilled Electronically?, Centre for Commercial and Property Law, QUT, Brisbane, 2002.
18 Other names used to call the output of the hash function include hash value, hash message
digest, digital fingerprint: National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Recommendation
for Key Management — Part 1: General (revised)’, NIST Special Publication 800-57,
Gaithersburg, 2007, p 35.
19 As noted by McCullagh, ‘[T]he identity of the sender is based upon the presumption that the
signer is the only person who has access to the private key’: A McCullagh, W Caelli and
P Little, ‘Signature Stripping: A Digital Dilemma’ (2001) 1 JILT at [4.2].
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have confidence that the sender’s public key is what it purports to be, that is,
the sender’s public key actually did come from the sender. The key to the
successful functioning of PKI is the recipient’s trust in the CA.
This description shows that unlike handwritten signatures, where it is
generally accepted to be the ‘signatory’s name written in their own hand on a
piece of paper’,20 digital signatures are generated using two mathematically
related keys consisting of a set of prime numbers. This necessitates the
management of these cryptographic keys which is said to be ‘essential to the
effective use of cryptography for security’.21 If PKI is used, this will mean the
use of a RA to verify identity before that person is issued with a digital
certificate and the use of a CA to manage the cryptographic keys. There is no
equivalent role required for handwritten signatures.
Thus from a functional perspective, digital signatures are comparable to
handwritten signatures, but from a form perspective they are fundamentally
different to handwritten signatures.
The question then arises, which will be answered later in this paper: how do
these components affect the vulnerability of digital signatures to fraud? Will
they make digital signatures more or less secure than handwritten signatures?
How can these components be managed to increase security and what
regulatory and compliance issues, if any, would arise from this?
Before answering this question, the following section outlines how digital
signatures will be used in the NECS and the section after explains why
analysing the susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud is necessary and
pertinent.
3.2 Digital signatures in the NECS
Under current practices, the person transferring or creating an interest, or an
attorney under a valid power of attorney, is responsible for executing the
appropriate land title instruments. The signature here is a handwritten
signature.
In the NECS, the handwritten signature will be replaced with a digital
signature. The owner will sign an authorisation form22 authorising the
subscriber to act on his or her behalf. When the electronic forms are prepared
and populated with the relevant information, the certifier for the subscriber
will digitally sign the electronic form before lodging the form for registration.
The digital signature is not witnessed. In the NECS, only certifiers may
digitally sign instruments.23
It is also likely that public key infrastructure (PKI) will be used in the
NECS, with NECS taking advantage of the Australian Federal Government’s
gatekeeper strategy. The gatekeeper strategy was developed by the
government to increase confidence in the online economy by providing a
government endorsed online trust framework using public key technology.
20 See Christensen, Duncan and Low, above n 17, p 35. In addition to the signatory’s name,
courts have also accepted a range of signatures including crosses, initials, printed names and
rubber stamps: ibid, p 35.
21 National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-57, above n 18, p 15.
22 See ‘Draft Operations Description’, above n 6, at [9.2.3.3]. This signature is a handwritten
signature.
23 Ibid, at [4.4].
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Gatekeeper is an accreditation process.24 Organisations wanting to achieve
gatekeeper accreditation in order to provide gatekeeper services must undergo
this accreditation process whereby the Australian Government Information
Management Office (AGIMO) evaluates the organisation applying for
gatekeeper credentials to determine if the organisation satisfies the
accreditation requirements before issuing the organisation with a gatekeeper
certificate. If an organisation does achieve gatekeeper accreditation, then this
is supposed to be an assurance that the organisation has met rigorous standards
in relation to security, operational procedures and technical requirements.
In the NECS, it is likely that VeriSign, which has gatekeeper accreditation,
will be used as the CA to provide gatekeeper compliant digital certificates for
digital signing.25At present, VeriSign offers three different types of gatekeeper
compliant certificates:
• Individual certificates (grades26 1–3) which identify an individual
only;
• Non individual certificates (grades 1–3) which identify an individual
which is related to an organisation; and
• ABN-DSCs (the only grade supported is grade 2) which identify an
individual which is related to an organisation with an Australian
Business Number.
The issue of which digital certificate should be used in the NECS was the
subject of a consultation exercise.27 The outcome of the consultation exercise
was that the Grade 2 gatekeeper-compliant Australian Business
Number-Digital Signature Certificates (ABN-DSCs) will be used.
To obtain an ABN-DSC digital certificate,28 the authorised officer for the
subscriber has to set up anABN-DSC account with VeriSign. This requires the
officer to enrol for an ABN-DSC account for the company or subscriber,
complete the application and post it to VeriSign. The officer must also
purchase security tokens29 (the number would depend on how many people
24 For more on the accreditation process, see Australian Government Department of Finance
and Deregulation, Accreditation and Listing Process, at <http://www.finance.gov.au/e-
government/security-and-authentication/gatekeeper/accreditation.html> (accessed 26 July
2009).
25 See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, ‘Draft National Business Model for the
establishment of a National Electronic Conveyancing System V.10’, National Electronic
Conveyancing Office, Melbourne, 2007, at [11].
26 Under gatekeeper, the certificate grades refer to ‘the level of trust that may be attributed to
a certificate. The higher the grade of certificate the greater the level of trust in the certificate.’
Grade 3 is the highest grade, requiring 150 points of identity. See VeriSign, VeriSign
Gatekeeper, at <http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/individual.shtml> (accessed 26 July
2009).
27 See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, Expert Advice on NECS
<http://www.necs.gov.au/NECS-Independent-Expert-Advice-Reports/default.aspx>
(accessed 14 September 2009).
28 The following description of the process was obtained from the VeriSign website. The
process is for the Victorian EC system (which is the electronic land registration system
currently in use in Victoria) but would be applicable to NECS. See VeriSign, VeriSign
Gatekeeper: Electronic Conveyancing, at <http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/ec/>
(accessed 9 July 2009). For more information about the Victorian EC system, see the
system’s website at <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/> and Low, above n 5.
29 Security tokens may be purchased online from the VeriSign website. The one used by the
308 (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal
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within the organisation would be given signing authority access in NECS) in
which to store the digital certificates.
The officer then enrols for an Authorised Officer ABN-DSC certificate. This
stage requires the officer to go to Australia Post for a 100 point identification
check. Upon completion of the identification check, Australia Post sends the
details to VeriSign. VeriSign processes the application and notifies the officer
by email when the ABN-DSC is ready for installation. The ABN-DSC
certificate is downloaded onto the security token.
After downloading the Authorised Officer ABN-DSC the authorised officer
can purchase and approve additional Authorised Officer and Standard
ABN-DSCs for any other signing user in the organisation, via the VeriSign
Gatekeeper Account Management system, which is a web based tool, to
purchase, approve, revoke and view certificates for the authorised officer’s
organisation.
The signing users who are receiving the standard ABN-DSCs must also
enrol for their certificate online. When the enrolment is completed, the user
receives a confirmation email from VeriSign. The user must then forward that
email to the authorised officer to notify the authorised officer of the enrolment.
The authorised officer can then request VeriSign to issue the user with a
standard ABN-DSC certificate. When the certificate is issued, the user is
notified by email and the email contains instructions for downloading the
certificate.
Thus using anABN-DSC for NECS means that only the authorised officer’s
identity is verified by VeriSign but employees nominated by the authorised
officer may be issued with standard certificates without having their individual
identities independently verified by VeriSign.30
4 Fraud in the Torrens system
An article published by the author in 200631 showed that the Torrens system
is not invulnerable to fraud, with the greatest risk emanating from forgery of
the victim’s signature, usually on the transfer or mortgage instrument,
followed by identity fraud. Fraud continues to be perpetrated despite
safeguards, such as witnessing requirements, which are put in place to
minimise fraud.
The occurrence of fraud creates a conflict of interest between the original
registered proprietor who has been deprived of an interest and the bona fide
purchaser acquiring the title free from the fraud. When this conflict occurs, it
is said that a land registration system can be designed to enforce one of the
two competing interests — the current owner or the last rightful owner32 (the
claimant) but it cannot protect both.33
Victorian EC is Rainbow iKey USB Token, see VeriSign, Smartcards, Tokens and Readers,
at <www.verisign.com.au/smartcard/buy> (accessed 26 July 2009).
30 The security implications arising from this will be discussed further below.
31 Low (2006), above n 15. The discussion in this section is adapted from R Low, The Use of
Technology to Automate the Registration Process within the Torrens System and its Impact
on Fraud: An Analysis, PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2008.
32 Baird defines this as ‘the person who last acquired the land via a sequence of consensual
transfers’: D Baird and T Jackson, ‘Information, Uncertainty and the Transfer of Property’
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Through this it can be seen that the twin objectives of the Torrens system,
which are security of title and facility of transfer, are not mutually compatible
or, as stated by Whalan:
to some extent in opposition with one another, for the protection given to a bona fide
purchaser for value is sometimes given at the expense of an ‘owner’s’ secure title.34
The Torrens system resolves this conflict in favour of the object of facilitating
transfers of title35 and the insurance principle is used to ‘bridge this gap’36 by
providing compensation to the owner who has been deprived of his or her
interest or estate in the land.37 Thus the owner who has been deprived of title
because of fraud could apply for compensation from the state for this
deprivation.
However, because the Torrens system favours facility of transfers over
security of title, it can be argued that the occurrence of fraud (which causes
this conflict) causes an erosion of an owner’s security of title. This in turn
leads to a loss of confidence in the Torrens system’s ability to provide security
of title. Although the Torrens system uses the insurance principle to ensure
that owners deprived of title through fraud are able to receive compensation
from the state for their loss, there is usually a process that must be undertaken
by the owners in order to obtain compensation. In some states inAustralia, this
(1984) 13 J Legal Stud 299 at 301. See also M Hughson, M Neave and P O’Connor,
‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the Conflict Between Purchasers and Prior
Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 MULR 460 at 461: ‘[t]here are two main ways of resolving such
conflicts. One approach is to protect the holder of an interest by preventing the transferor
from passing a title which he or she lacks . . . The alternative approach, typified by systems
of registration of title, is to protect innocent purchasers of interests, regardless of whether or
not the transferor has a good title.’
33 Baird and Jackson, above n 32, at 300, explain it in this way: ‘In a world where information
is not perfect, we can protect a later owner’s interest fully, or we can protect the earlier
owner’s interest fully. But we cannot do both’.
34 D Whalan, The Torrens System in Australia, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1982, p 345. Also see
W Taylor, ‘Scotching Frazer v Walker’ (1970) 44 ALJ 248 at 248: ‘It is very difficult to get
near perfection in both fields, and the best we can expect is a carefully balanced
compromise.’
35 See Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569; [1967] 1 All ER 649; [1967] NZLR 1069; [1967] 2
WLR 411 — since this decision, the theory of immediate indefeasibility has prevailed. See
‘Torrens Foundations Stabilised’ (1993) 67 ALJ 535 and ‘Shaking the Foundations’ (1991)
65 ALJ 611. Note that Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248; [1891-4] All ER Rep Ext 2047 has
never been expressly overruled. Thus it is arguable that it is still good law in the situation
where fraud involves the registration of the name of a fictitious proprietor.
36 Whalan, above n 34, p 345. Also see P Butt, Land Law, 5th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co,
Pyrmont, 2005, p 802:
But this protection comes at a cost: for in conferring title on an incoming proprietor,
registration extinguishes the title of the former proprietor . . . In this way, the Torrens
system can work hardship on those who have been deprived of their land. And so, as a
concomitant to indefeasibility, the Real Property Act creates compensation rights in
favour of persons who have lost land or an interest in land through the operation of the
Act.
37 It is because of this insurance principle that Whalan suggests the term ‘state guaranteed’ title
rather than indefeasible title as more accurately describing the nature of the title conferred
by registration under the Torrens system: above n 34, p 297. Also see P O’Connor, Security
of Property Rights and Land Title Registration Systems, PhD Thesis, Monash University,
2003.
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involves pursuing the fraudulent person first before an application for
compensation can be made.
In this respect, it can be said that fraud has a negative impact:
• on the owner who has lost title and who must now undertake the
process of applying for compensation from the state;
• on the owner’s confidence in his or her ability to hold title securely
under the Torrens system, which may lead to a general loss of
confidence in other owners as well;
• this loss in confidence in ability to hold title securely may also lead
to a general loss in the economic benefits that are said to accrue from
adopting a land registration system; and finally
• on the state which, if the claim is proved, has to pay compensation
to the owner for the loss.
This demonstrates the importance of minimising fraud risks so that the
integrity of the Torrens system can be maintained. Consequently, if the NECS
is implemented, stakeholders will need to be assured that the integrity of the
Torrens system can continue to be maintained. Since, as outlined above,
NECS will utilise digital signatures by requiring certifiers to digitally sign
instruments before they can be lodged for registration, this makes digital
signatures an integral component of the Torrens system. The next section will
analyse the digital signature’s vulnerability to fraud and how these fraud risks
may be minimised and stakeholders can be assured of the integrity of the
digital signature and, through that, the integrity of the Torrens system.
5 The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud
Assuming that PKI will be used to key management and distribution, the
following components can be identified as necessary for digital signature
usage in the NECS:
• Verification of identity and registration of users
• Algorithm selection
• Generation and transmission of cryptographic keys
• Key storage and protection
• Revocation of keys
This section will examine the susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud by
analysing each of these components where the fraud risks for each component
will be discussed and analysed.
5.1 Registration
As noted above, the gatekeeper PKI framework will be used by the NECS and
it is likely that VeriSign will be used to act as RA. To obtain an ABN-DSC
certificate and subsequent standard certificates, the first step is for the
authorised user to have his or her identity validated.
5.1.1 Fraud risk
It is widely recognised that correct identification is critical in a public key
infrastructure. As noted by Whitman:
the initial authentication is of critical importance, since a mistake at that juncture
may allow an impostor to perpetrate a large number of fraudulent transactions . . .
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a very high degree of care should be expected of CAs in registering people who will
use their digital IDs in real estate conveyancing.38
The risk here is a failure in the registration process, so that the fraudulent
person attacking the registration process is incorrectly issued with a digital
signing certificate from VeriSign.39
If the fraudulent person also has access to the NECS, then the fraudulent
person can then use this access to prepare the necessary instruments, digitally
signing them (using his or her digital signing certificate from VeriSign) and
lodge them for registration. The ability to perpetrate this type of fraud was
identified as a new fraud risk in NECS.40
5.1.2 Discussion
The key here is that the fraudulent person must have or is able to gain access
to the NECS. Without this access, the fraudulent person, even though armed
with a digital signing certificate from VeriSign, will not be able to perpetrate
fraud. Thus it is the registration process from NECS that is a potential source
of vulnerability because without access to the NECS, fraud cannot be
perpetrated.
One example of how the fraudulent person can obtain access to NECS and
obtain a digital signing certificate from VeriSign is to impersonate an
individual who would fall within the class of persons entitled to digitally sign
38 D Whitman, ‘The Robert Kratovil Memorial Seminar in Real Estate Law: Digital Recording
of Real Estate Conveyances’ (1999) 32 J Marshall L Rev 227 at 256. Also see Standards
Australia, ‘Information Technology — Security Techniques — Specification of TTP
Services to Support the Application of Digital Signatures’, AS 5045, Standards Australia,
Sydney, 2004, at [5.1.1]: ‘The trustworthiness of any Public Key Infrastructure relies on the
proper identification and registration of entities’ and National Institute of Standards and
Technology, above n 18, p 92: ‘During user registration, an entity interacts with a
registration authority to become an authorised member of a security domain . . . Since
applications will depend upon the identity established during this process, it is crucial that
the registration authority establish appropriate procedures for the validation of identity . . .
The strength (or weakness) of a security infrastructure will often depend on the identification
process.’
39 This has occurred in the past. In 2001, VeriSign was tricked by an unknown individual
pretending to be a Microsoft executive into issuing false digital certificates in Microsoft’s
name. VeriSign officials assumed responsibility for the mishap, stating that it was the failure
of the human part of the verification process: New York Times, ‘Warning From Microsoft on
False Digital Signatures’, 2001, at <http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/03/23/technology/23SOFT.html> (accessed 25 July 2009).
40 See Low, above n 5 and Low, above n 15. Also see the National Electronic Conveyancing
Office, Risk Assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System, 2007, at
<http://www.necs.gov.au/NECS-Independent-Expert-Advice-Reports/default.aspx>
(accessed 14 September 2009), Vol 3, p 39, risk reference 58 identifying a risk to the
proposed NECS that a certifier uses the NECS user ID and password and signing key to
prepare and sign documents without authority of the proprietor (eg, by creating an entirely
fictitious transaction and mortgaging an unencumbered interest without the registered
proprietor’s knowledge and absconds with funds). In addition, one of the comments received
by the risk assessment during its consultation process related to the likelihood of a certifier
of the NECS acting without authority where it was observed that there was ‘much more than
33% chance of happening once in the first five years. It is thought that it is almost guaranteed
that at some time in the first 5 years someone will push ahead with a transaction without
having the necessary form signed’: Risk Assessment of the National Electronic
Conveyancing System, ibid, Vol 1, p 98.
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instruments in the NECS. A prime example would be a sole practitioner — the
fraudulent person could apply to VeriSign for an ABN-DSC certificate, then
apply to NECS to register as a subscriber and certifier of NECS, which would
allow the fraudulent person to access NECS, prepare and digitally sign
instruments before lodging them for registration. The fraudulent person would
have to provide either genuine or falsified identity documents in order to
circumvent the registration processes of both VeriSign and NECS.
To a large extent, the vulnerability of the NECS registration process to
fraudulent attacks hinges on the robustness of the registration process, and this
would in turn depend on the person responsible for verifying identity.
Advances in technology, however, particularly in computer software and
hardware, have given criminals the ability to produce high quality fake
identity documents. In these situations, even if employees are acting with the
utmost care, it would be difficult to prevent identity fraud because of the
difficulty in detecting whether the identity document is genuine or false.41 To
improve the robustness of the registration process, NECS could consider
providing education and training to its employees in recognising fake identity
documents and to raise an anti-fraud awareness culture so that employees take
more care when registering potential applicants.
Another option is for the fraudulent person to collude with someone inside
the system. For example, the fraudulent person could collude with an
employee of NECS42 where the employee could register the fraudulent person
as a subscriber and certifier of NECS and the fraudulent person could then
register with VeriSign to obtain a digital signing certificate. The fraudulent
person could be an insider themself. The fraudulent person could be an
employee of NECS who could register himself or herself as a subscriber and
certifier and apply to VeriSign for a digital certificate.
Internal frauds are becoming a growing concern for organisations. Insiders
are able to perpetrate fraud because they have inside knowledge of the
organisation and/or the electronic registration system. As noted by Smith:
The administration of modern technologically-based security systems involve a
wide range of personnel — from those engaged in the manufacture of security
devices to those who maintain sensitive information concerning passwords and
account records. Each has the ability to make use of confidential information or
facilities to commit fraud or . . . to collude with people outside the organisation to
perpetrate an offence.43
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider measures that may be
implemented by NECS to control internal fraud, but this could be an issue that
NECS could consider when drafting its internal policies and practices. For
example, NECS might consider screening potential employees first before
employing them, regularly monitoring employees for signs of fraudulent
41 For more on this point, see Low, above n 5.
42 See, eg, Risk Assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System, above n 40,
Vol 3, p 5, risk reference 6, identifying a risk to the proposed NECS that the NECS operator
may fail in verifying the identity or authority of a purported authorised officer of a subscriber
who is applying for registration on the subscriber’s behalf.
43 R Smith and A Graycar, ‘Identifying and Responding to Corporate Fraud in the 21st
Century’, Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Management, Sydney, 2003, p 8.
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behaviour and educating and training its employees to raise an anti-fraud
awareness culture.
Finally, the use of ABN-DSC digital certificates itself could present a risk
because it means that only the authorised officer’s identity is verified by
VeriSign and subsequent standard certificates can be issued on the nomination
of the authorised officer, and employees issued with these standard certificates
do not have to undergo an identity verification process. This nomination
process could itself constitute a weakness in the registration process because
the integrity of the process becomes dependent on the authorised officer.
NECS’ reason for using the ABN-DSC certificate is that the ABN-DSC
certificate would better serve the functions of NECS than the other types of
VeriSign certificates because the ABN-DSC links the person with the
organisation. Nevertheless in choosing this type of certificate, NECS should
be cognisant that the ability given to the authorised officer to issue standard
certificates to any person in the organisation without that person undergoing
identity checks may present a weakness to the registration process. The
fraudulent person could collude with an authorised officer of a subscriber to
the NECS,44 with the authorised officer applying to VeriSign for a standard
certificate to be issued to the fraudulent person. The authorised officer could
also make a mistake when issuing standard certificates, so that the incorrect
person is issued with a standard certificate. If fraud is perpetrated then liability
issues can arise. The Victorian EC System deals with this via its EC System
Rules. These rules have contractual effect binding upon the subscriber and the
registrar. The EC Rules impose an obligation on the subscriber to represent
and warrant to the registrar that the subscriber took reasonable steps to verify
the identity of standard PKI certificate holders, in effect, shifting liability onto
the subscriber to ensure that standard certificates are correctly issued.45
In conclusion, it would thus appear that human fallibility plays a large role
in the robustness of the registration process against the risk of being
circumvented. As seen from the above discussion, one method of reducing this
risk is through education and training — educating employees of the
importance of exercising utmost care and diligence during the registration
process and training employees to recognise fake identity documents.
Adopting internal controls to reduce the risk of internal fraud is also
important. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these fraud
preventative mechanisms in detail but this article recommends that NECS
consider these issues as part of its implementation process. Finally, if NECS
does use ABN-DSC digital certificates, then it should examine strategies to
ensure the correct issuance of standard certificates as well as how liability
issues can be dealt with, one option being to follow the Victorian EC System.
44 See, eg, Risk Assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System, above n 40,
Vol 3, p 6, risk reference 8, identifying a risk to the proposed NECS that an administrator or
employee of the NECS operator engaging in fraud by registering a fictitious subscriber
organisation. Also see risk reference 14 identifying a risk to the proposed NECS that an
administrator or employee of the NECS operator may fraudulently register actual or
fictitious users and certifiers in relation to a genuine subscriber.
45 See Department of Sustainability and Environment, EC System Rules Release 3, 2008, at
<http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/r_regdocs.html>, at [14.2] (accessed 26 July
2009).
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5.2 Algorithm selection
Digital signatures are generated using cryptographic algorithms.
Cryptographic algorithms provide different strengths of security, depending
on the algorithm and the key size used. Larger keys may take longer to
generate or longer to process the data. But the use of key sizes that are too
small may not provide adequate security.46
5.2.1 Fraud risk
The risk of using weak algorithms is that the fraudulent person can attack the
algorithm and if successful will be able to forge the digital signature.
5.2.2 Discussion
Various organisations such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology47 and Standards Australia have produced standards for algorithms
and key sizes. Again, the advantage of using the Australia Gatekeeper system
is that VeriSign would need to comply with gatekeeper recommended key
sizes and algorithms. Given that the gatekeeper system is an Australian
Government initiative, designed to facilitate and encourage the online
economy, this would suggest that AGIMO would continually monitor
technological developments in cryptography and revise its policy accordingly
to reflect these changes.48
Assuming that a sufficiently strong algorithm is used, an attack of this
nature would require a considerable amount of technical knowledge and
ability. In this regard, it is argued that the risk of the cryptographic algorithm
being attacked is slim.
5.3 Key generation and transmission
Once an applicant is registered with the CA/RA, keys would need to be
generated.
Generally, there are two options here: either the user can generate his or her
own key pair or the CA can generate the key pair. It appears that VeriSign’s
practice is for VeriSign to generate the keys. Upon generation, they are
transmitted to the user via a secure weblink to the user’s computer.
5.3.1 Fraud risk
Since the key pairs are generated by VeriSign, VeriSign must ensure that the
private key and digital signing certificate are securely transmitted to the user.49
The risk of insecure transmission is that the private key goes to the wrong
person or a fraudulent person can attack the transmission and obtain the
private key and use it to perpetrate fraud.
46 National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-57, above n 18, p 65.
47 Ibid.
48 For example, VeriSign recently decided to transition from the MD5 algorithm to the SHA-1
algorithm after research showed that there were security problems with MD5: B Levine,
‘VeriSign Drops Vulnerable Security Algorithm’, 2 January 2009, at
<http://www.enterprise-security-today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=12100467M9S9=7>
(accessed 26 July 2009).
49 Standards Australia, AS 5045, above n 38, at [5.2.2.1].
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5.3.2 Discussion
Similar to the observation in 5.2.2, it is argued that the risks of the key
generation and/or transmission processes being attacked are slim. The
fraudulent person would need to have a considerable amount of technical
knowledge and skill to mount such an attack. Assuming that VeriSign
implements secure transmission practices, the risk of this attack eventuating is
slim.
5.4 Key storage and protection
As noted by AS 11770.1-2003, ‘[K]eys are a critical part of any security
system that relies on cryptographic techniques’.50 They need to be protected
against threats of disclosure, modification and destruction.51 Key protection
applies to both the user and VeriSign because VeriSign uses its private key to
digitally sign digital certificates. For the user, the integrity of the private key
is critical because the premise of the digital signature is that the sender is the
only person who has access to the private key and that the private key has not
been compromised. On this basis, it must mean that it was the sender who
encrypted the message digest because:
the public key used by the receiver to decrypt the digital signature could only
correctly decrypt a digital signature that had been encrypted using the private key
associated with the key pair.52
But this reasoning is based on the assumption that the sender has not
compromised the private key, hence the importance of keeping the private key
safe.53
Since there are two aspects to this component, the user’s private key and
VeriSign’s private key, the analysis in this section will be divided into these
two sections.
5.4.1 Fraud risk
(i) User’s private key
The risk of the user’s private key being compromised is that a fraudulent
person may use it to digitally sign instruments and perpetrate fraud.
Compromise can occur in a variety of ways:
The user could unwittingly54 or accidentally provide access to his or her
50 Standards Australia, ‘Information Technology — Security Techniques — Key Management,
Part 1: Framework’, AS 11770.1, Standards Australia, Sydney, 2003, at [4.1].
51 Ibid, at [4.1].
52 McCullagh, Caelli and Little, above n 19, at [4.2].
53 Also see Standards Australia, ‘Strategies for the Implementation of a Public Key
Authentication Framework (PKAF) in Australia’, Standards Australia, Sydney, 1996, p 24:
‘The user must also apply key management techniques to the private key to ensure that the
level of trust in the integrity of the private key is not diminished.’
54 For example, the user could be tricked into sharing the private key or disclosing the
password used by the user to the fraudulent person. In the literature this is sometimes termed
as ‘social engineering’ where ‘a clever attacker can trick someone into sharing a secret
password, saving the attacker the trouble of performing a technical attack on the target
system. Such trickery is called a social engineering attack’: R Smith, Authentication: From
Passwords to Public Keys, Addison–Wesley Professional, Canada, 2002, p 19. Also see
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private key.55 For example, the user could use insecure storage options, such
as storing the private key on the user’s harddrive without any type of password
protection for the computer. This gives the fraudulent person easy access to
the user’s private key.
On the other hand it may also be possible for the fraudulent person to gain
access to the private key despite the user’s efforts to keep it safe, such as by
stealing it, since no security is ever foolproof against fraud.
The effect of a compromised private key is that the fraudulent person can
use the private key to digitally sign land title instruments. This is analogous
to the forging of a handwritten signature.56 The difference in this situation
from the one described in 5.1 above is that if the fraudulent person uses
another user’s private key to digitally sign instruments, the digital signature
would appear to be of that user’s. In 5.1 above, because the fraudulent person
is registered with NECS and VeriSign and, through that registration has a
digital signing certificate, the digital signature would therefore be the
fraudulent person’s.
(ii) CA’s private key
The CA itself should have secure key management facilities for generating
and keeping its own key pair. As the CA’s private key is used to sign the public
key certificate, the CA should ensure it keeps its private key safe because
possession of the CA’s private key will allow the possessor to masquerade as
B Scheneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 2004, p 266; and K Mitnick and W Simon The Art of Deception: Controlling the
Human Factor of Security, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2003.
55 See, eg, Risk Assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing System, above n 40,
Vol 3, p 38, risk reference 56 identifying a risk to the proposed NECS that a registered
certifier of the NECS may be careless with their user ID and password and their signing key
enabling unauthorised access and use by another internal party (such as another certifier or
user) or by an external party. Another risk was identified (risk reference 57) that a registered
certifier may not have been careless with their user ID and password and their signing key
but a fraudulent party obtains these and commits fraud.
56 Articles discussing the potential for digital signatures to be forged include: J Winn, ‘The
Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and Internet
Commerce’ (2001) 37 Idaho Law Rev 353 at 366 noting the ‘problems raised by trying to tie
an identity described in a digital signature certificate with the intention of the identified party
to be bound to the contents of an electronic record. These include whether the correct person
has accessed the private key associated with the digital signature being used’; P Moon,
‘Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Digital Signatures’ (1999) LSJ 57 at 58:
‘Can a digital signature be forged? To sign your digital signature on a document without
authority, a person needs two things: the secret computer file that generates your signature
and knowledge of the secret password that prevents unauthorised use of that secret file if it
does escape. Without both of those things, your digital signature is unforgeable’; I Yates,
‘Authenticating Yourself in the Virtual World: Digital Signatures’ (2004) 42(7) LSJ 20 at 20:
‘The (critical) assumption is that the owner of the private key really does keep it totally
secure’; J Halvey, ‘Hazards on the Information Superhighway: The Virtual Marketplace’
(1996) 45 Emory LJ 959 at 978: ‘As with paper signatures, digital signatures can be forged.
For digital signatures, forgery differs from traditional forgery in a very important way. The
only way a digital signature can be forged is if the holder of the private digital signature key
loses control of it’; and M Schellekens, Electronic Signatures: Authentication Technology
from a Legal Perspective, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2004.
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the CA and generate public key certificates. As noted by Standards Australia:
‘If the private key of a CA is compromised, the security of that CA’s domain
may collapse.’57
5.4.2 Discussion
(i) User’s private key
The ability of the fraudulent person to fraudulently use a person’s private key
will depend entirely on the user’s ability to keep the private key safe. The
fraudulent person will not be able to use someone else’s private key to
digitally sign a document unless he or she has access to it and can activate it
appropriately.
A discussion on private key protection can be divided into three aspects:
(1) Storage
(2) Use of passwords
(3) Revocation
(1) Storage
Where the private key is stored is an important security consideration, since
different storage locations provide different levels of security. Even though a
private key may be password protected, poor storage of the private key will
provide the fraudulent person with the ability to copy or steal the private key
and, given time, to guess the password, such as through the use of password
cracking computer programs. Thus poor storage puts the fraudulent person
one step closer to being able to digitally sign instruments. There are several
options available for storing the private key.58
The simplest and most convenient storage option may be to store the private
key on the hard disk of a computer workstation. This is the least secure
method because it is possible to access the private key through a network of
which the computer workstation is attached to.
Thus, where the private key is stored on the computer, individual users
should consider using computer systems that:
• require periodic password changes;
• deny access after a specified number of consecutive tries using
invalid passwords;
• use automatic shutdown facilities when they have not been used for
a specified period, following which the user is required to log on
again.59
Other storage options include the use of a removable device. There are a
variety of removable devices that may be used, such as floppy disks, memory
chip cards, magnetic strip cards, smart cards and USB drives.60 Using a
removable device allows the user to remove it when it is not in use and store
it in a secure place, such as an office safe. This may provide a stronger security
57 Standards Australia, AS ISO 17090.1, above n 16, at [7.4].
58 See Whitman, above n 38, at 253.
59 See R Smith, ‘Identity-Related Crime: Risks and Countermeasures’, Trends & issues in
crime and criminal justice No 129, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1999, p 4.
60 See N Ferguson, Practical Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2003, p 353.
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mechanism than simply storing the private key on the computer.61 However,
some types of removable devices offer better security than others. Some of
these removable devices (termed ‘secure tokens’) such as cryptographic
processor smart cards, PC cards and USB processor tokens, contain
microprocessors and have a non-volatile memory.62
In these secure tokens, access to the information stored on the token may be
controlled by a password; access may also be disabled after multiple failed
attempts; also they are often tamper-resistant. These secure tokens provide a
better method of protecting the private key as there is no electrical connection
to the computer, it cannot be accessed through a network and it is possible to
place authentication algorithms on the token so that even if the fraudulent
person has managed to obtain the token, he or she must be authenticated in
order to activate the private key. There are different types of authentication
methods such as what you know or who you are. So, for example, it is possible
to password protect the token. Since access is disabled after multiple failed
attempts, the fraudulent person is restricted in the number of attempts he or
she can make in guessing the password. Finally, as these tokens are tamper
resistant, physical attacks on the token to break it open and extract its data are
made more difficult.63 According to Ferguson and Schneier, secure tokens are
‘currently one of the best and most practical methods of storing secret keys’.64
The problem is, however, that even if secure tokens are used, users may still
undermine security.65 For example, users may leave the secure token plugged
into a computer even when they are not around. They may write down their
passwords and leave them on the computer. They may share their private key
with other users, including the fraudulent person, providing an opportunity to
use their private key.
Ultimately, therefore, it is the diligence of users in keeping their private key
safe and in adopting secure usage practices that is vital in preventing fraud. It
could be left to individual users’ internal practices and policies on the types of
storage locations they may use for storing digital certificates and on secure
usage practices. The problem with this is that some users may not appreciate
the importance of secure storage and usage, or may not understand the various
storage options and levels of security provided. So a more effective method
may be to formulate a set of best practice guidelines to guide users in secure
storage and usage of digital certificates. However, this raises regulatory and
compliance issues — a set of best practice guidelines will be useless as a fraud
preventative mechanism if users do not comply with it.66
In this regard, perhaps education and training could be used to encourage
compliance. Users could be educated about various storage options, the levels
61 See A Srivastava, ‘Is Internet Security a Major Issue with Respect to the Slow Acceptance
Rate of Digital Signatures?’ (2005) 21(5) Computer Law and Security Report 392 at 398.
62 See Ferguson, above n 60, p 353. Non-volatile memory means ‘a memory that retains its
data when power is removed’:. Also see S Kent and L Millett (Eds), Who Goes There:
Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy, National Research Council (US) Committee on
Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications, Washington, 2003; Smith,
above n 54, p 260 and Schneier, above n 54, p 315.
63 See Ferguson, above n 60, p 354.
64 Ibid, p 354.
65 Ibid, p 354.
66 This point was also raised in Low, above n 5.
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of security provided and the importance of secure storage and usage as a
means of fraud prevention.67 The use of education and training as part of a
fraud preventative strategy raises the issue of how it might be deployed
effectively. Who should be responsible for compiling the material for
education and training and for overseeing those who need to receive them?
Should it be left to individual organisations or should it be centrally
controlled, coordinated and administered?
These issues are beyond the scope of this article but it is suggested that
NECS undertake a comparison of the various contractual and legislative rules
and guidelines in jurisdictions that already use an electronic land registration
system to assess their effectiveness for use in the NECS.68 It is also suggested
that NECS investigate the use of education and training of users as part of its
fraud preventative policy.
(2) Secure selection and use of passwords
Passwords can be used to improve security but passwords can also be the
‘[A]chilles’ heel of many systems’.69 There are a variety of ways in which the
fraudulent person may obtain the password.70 For example, where password
selection is left to the users of the system, users generally tend to select
passwords that are memorable, such as mothers’ maiden names, birthdays and
other personal information.71 While they may be easy to remember, they are
also easy to guess and therefore susceptible to dictionary attacks. Albrecht
also noted that it is common to find users who share their passwords with
others, or write down their passwords or re-use passwords for various
applications so that the same password is used to access a secure work-related
system as well as for other less secure applications such as internet email.72
67 Ferguson, above n 60, p 354.
68 See also Low, above n 5, suggesting that this comparison would be useful for the NECS.
69 S Albrecht, C Albrecht and C Albrecht, Fraud Examination, 2nd ed, South Western
Educational Publishing, Ohio, 2006, p 575.
70 For more on these methods, see, eg: K Singh, ‘On Improvements to Password Security’
(1985) 19(1) AGM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 53; B Pinkas and T Sander,
‘Securing Passwords Against Dictionary Attacks’, Paper presented at the Proceedings of the
19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Washington, 2002;
S Gaw and E Felten, ‘Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts’, Paper
presented at the Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
SOUPS, Pittsburgh, 2006; S Cherry, ‘The Effects of Spyware and Phishing on the Privacy
Rights of Internet Users’ (2006) 2 I/S Jnl of Law and Policy 573; L Sullins, ‘“Phishing” for
a Solution: Domestic and International Approaches to Decreasing Online Identity Theft’
(2006) 20 Emory Intl L Rev 397; J Lynch, ‘Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control
Methods and their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech LJ
259; R Hahn and A Layne-Farrar, ‘The Law and Economics of Software Security’ (2006) 30
Harvard JL & Pub Pol’y 283; Smith, above n 54 and Schneier, above n 54.
71 See, eg, Smith, above n 54, p 42: ‘Stories abound of people using their own names, family
names, computer names, and other obvious words as passwords’ and p 87: ‘Numerous
studies of computer user behaviour have shown that many people in any reasonably sized
computer user population will choose memorable words for passwords’; J Brainard et al,
‘Fourth Factor Authentication: Somebody You Know’, Paper presented at the Proceedings of
the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Virginia, 2006; Gaw
and Felten, above n 70 and Pinkas and Sander, above n 70.
72 Albrecht et al, above n 69, p 575. Also see National Research Council (US) Committee on
Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications, above n 62; B Ives, K Walsh
and H Schneider, ‘The Domino Effect of Password Reuse’ (2004) 47(4) Communications of
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Hence a fraudulent person who is able to guess the password for the internet
email would be able to use that same password to access all other applications
which use the same password.73 In addition, users may also fall prey to
various malware attacks or phishing attacks. In a phishing attack, the user, as
a victim of the phishing attack, could unwittingly disclose the password.74
Malicious software or malware, such as worms, viruses and Trojan horses,75
can be planted on the user’s computer without the user’s knowledge to record
and transmit details of everything that he or she typed on that keyboard,
including his or her password.
One possible solution for the problem of poor choice of passwords may be
to restrict the types of passwords that users may use, forcing users to select
stronger passwords.76 According to Smith, there are generally three ways of
doing this:
• for the system to use a password cracking program to find weak
passwords; when one is found, the system advises the user to choose
a better password;
• for the system to use a automatic password generator program to
generate passwords for its users so that users no longer choose their
own passwords;
• for the system to check passwords proactively. Every time a user
changes a password, the system checks the new password against
various password construction rules to ensure that the new password
chosen is of sufficient strength.77
the ACM 75 at 76: ‘Users who reuse passwords often fail to realize their most well-defended
account is no more secure than the most poorly defended account for which they use that
same password’; J A Halderman, B Waters and E W Felten, ‘A Convenient Method for
Securely Managing Passwords’, Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 14th International
Conference on World Wide WebWWW, Japan, 2005, p 471: ‘One common practice we have
observed is to choose a single strong password and use it for many accounts. The danger, of
course, is that an attacker could learn the password from one account and guess other places
where the user is likely to use the same login information’.
73 For example, a hacker was able to hack into the Gmail account of an employee of Twitter
which enabled the hacker to access official Twitter company documents stored on Google
because the password used for the personal email was also used for accessing work-related
documents: P Hartsock, ‘Rifling through Twitter’s Underwear Drawer’, E-Commerce Times,
12 July 2009, at <http://www.ecommercetimes.com/edpick/67619.html> (accessed 25 July
2009).
74 Phishing involves ‘attempts to fraudulently acquire sensitive information such as passwords
and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business’: A Davidson,
‘Phishing: The Identity Theft Epidemic’ (2006) 26(3) Proctor 37 at 37.
75 The term ‘spyware’ is also used to describe these malicious software. Game notes that the
term ‘spyware’ is the ‘umbrella term under which numerous technologies, both legal and
malicious fall. These include: adware, Trojans, hijackers, key loggers, dialers and malware.
While each of these technologies has its own unique behaviour, for the most part they are
installed without a user’s informed and explicit consent and tend to extract varying degrees
of personal information, usually without that end-user’s consent’: D Game, A Blakley and
M Armstrong, ‘The Legal Status of Spyware’ (2006) 59 Fed Comm LJ 157 at 160. Trojan
spyware, eg, ‘operates with a focus on stealing passwords by using a “trojanized” piece of
software to grab passwords’: ibid, at 162.
76 See Smith, above n 54, p 94 and Pinkas and Sander, above n 70, p 169.
77 Smith, above n 54, p 94.
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The problem with this solution is that users may find ways to bypass these
forcing mechanisms, particularly if they cannot remember passwords they are
forced to use. They may resort to writing down the password, thereby
defeating the whole purpose of requiring users to have strong passwords.
These users may continue sharing their passwords with others or continue
re-using these passwords. Thus, similar to the conclusion drawn above,
ultimately it is the vigilance of users in choosing strong passwords that is vital
in preventing fraud. How may users be encouraged to select strong passwords
and to adopt secure password usage practices? Should it be left to individual
users’ internal practices and policies as to the choice of passwords and secure
usage practices? The problem with this is that users may not understand the
importance of selecting strong passwords or of not sharing passwords or
re-using passwords. A more effective approach may be to formulate a set of
best practice guidelines to guide users regarding password selection and rules
of usage. These guidelines could contain rules regarding password selection
and usage, for example:
• Passwords must be at least six characters long;
• Passwords must contain a mixture of letters (both upper and lower
case), digits and punctuation characters;
• Passwords must never be shared;
• Passwords must be memorised. If a password is written down, it must
be locked up; and
• For password replacements, an entirely new and different password
must be chosen. Users may not add a sequential number or other
character to the end of their old passwords.78
Use of best practice guidelines raises similar issues as canvassed above,
namely, the type of guidelines that may be used and the manner in which the
guidelines may be imposed. The suggestion made in (2) above that NECS
compare the various legislative and contractual rules relating to password use
is applicable here.
In addition, education and training could also be used by, for example,
educating users on the importance of selecting strong passwords and abiding
by secure password usage,79 and on phishing scams and malware threats, so
that they are aware of these scams so as not to fall prey to them. It is beyond
the scope of this article to consider this in detail but the recommendation in
5.1 and (2) above that NECS consider using education and training is also
applicable here.
78 See Smith, above n 54, p 156 and Land Information New Zealand, Landonline Security, at
<http://www.landonline.govt.nz/content/general/security.asp> (accessed 14 September
2009).
79 See Ives, Walsh and Schneider, above n 72, at 78; A Adams and M Sasse, ‘Users Are Not
the Enemy’ (1999) 42 (12) Communications of the ACM 41 at 46: ‘Provide instruction and
training on how to construct usable and secure passwords’ and National Research Council
(US) Committee on Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications, above
n 62.
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(3) Certificate revocation
As a consequence of the possibility of compromise of the user’s key as
described above, procedures for cancellation and revocation of keys become
vital, as these will help to prevent its unauthorised use.80
The problem with revocation procedures is that the process is dependent to
a large extent on the user informing the CA that his or her private key has been
compromised. It is only when the CA receives certificate revocation requests
from its users that the CA can process these requests and generate certificate
revocation lists to show that the certificates are no longer valid. It is thus
possible for the CA to not revoke a certificate as they do not realise that there
has been a compromise.
Thus while revocation is a means of mitigating fraud risks, its success again
depends on the user informing the CA that the private key has been
compromised. In some cases it is possible that the private key is compromised
without the user’s knowledge.
The above discussion demonstrates that in terms of the possibility of the
private key being compromised and fraud perpetrated, human fallibility is the
key to this risk. If the user does comply with secure storage and password
selection requirements, then the risk of this attack eventuating is slim and
would require a certain amount of technical knowledge and skill on the part
of the fraudulent person. For example, if a smartcard is used to store the
private key and the smart card is password protected, the fraudulent person
would need sufficient computing strength to mount a brute force attack to
discover the password and access the private key. Thus, so long as the user
continues to use secure storage options, attacking the private key in this
manner is quite difficult.
(ii) CA’s private key
As noted above, the danger of the CA’s private key being compromised is that
some other entity can impersonate the CA and generate certificates. Again, the
advantage to NECS of using the gatekeeper system is the accreditation process
which VeriSign must go through to become accredited with the gatekeeper. It
is expected that VeriSign would need to demonstrate that it has adequate
security procedures for keeping its private key safe and so it is arguable that
the risk of VeriSign’s key being compromised is lower than the risk of a user’s
private key being compromised.
6 Synthesis of discussion
The above discussion shows that similar to handwritten signatures, digital
signatures are also susceptible to fraud. The difference is that because digital
signatures require the implementation of various components in order for it to
be generated, each component then may be attacked. However, this does not
necessarily mean that digital signatures are less secure than handwritten
signatures.
In examining all the components, it can be seen that in some respects, it
80 Compromise of the private key is not the only reason for revocation. Other reasons why
certificates may need to be revoked include where there has been false identification of the
user or when the user requests a cancellation.
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may be more difficult to attack the digital signature because of the technical
skill and knowledge that is required. Thus for example, it would be difficult to
successfully attack the algorithm if a sufficiently strong algorithm is used.
It can also be seen from the discussion that a great part of security depends
on human frailty. For example, smartcards may provide excellent security but
this security is lost if the user allows another person to use the private key on
the smartcard. In this regard, it can be said that there are two aspects to digital
signature security — the human aspect and the technical aspect.
From a technical perspective, the advantage for NECS in using the
Australian Government Gatekeeper system is that it can make use of a
framework developed specifically to facilitate PKI usage. Its accreditation
process means NECS can be assured that VeriSign has adequate policies and
procedures to fulfil its role as CA and it can be assumed that the algorithms
and key generation methods used will be sufficiently strong and in keeping
with current cryptography trends. So from a technical perspective, attacking
the digital signature is difficult.
Can the same conclusion be drawn for the human aspect?
As discussed in 5 above, the strength of the registration process depends
largely on the employees responsible for verifying identity in their ability to
recognise fake identity documents. Use of the ABN-DSC certificate may also
present a weakness because standard certificates can be issued on the
authorisation of the authorised officer without any identity checks being
performed.
The risk of the private key being compromised is entirely dependent on the
users. The most current technology could be used to store the private key but
its security could still be compromised if the user adopts insecure practices.
Again, while some form of policy or best practice guidelines could be used to
provide guidance on secure storage and usage of private keys, users would
need to comply with these guidelines for it to be successful in ensuring
security.
If, however, all these components are properly implemented, both from a
technical and human perspective, then it can be said that attacking the digital
signature can actually be quite difficult; while forging a handwritten signature
is simple in that given a sample signature, anyone can make an attempt at
forging it.
This point demonstrates the difference between handwritten signatures and
digital signatures — that there is no requirement or a need for individuals to
keep their handwritten signatures safe because it is not possible to do so. In
contrast, the use of digital signatures require the implementation of various
components and for digital signatures to remain secure, each of these
components must be properly implemented and managed, both from a
technical and human perspective.81
Given that using gatekeeper gives NECS the advantage of using a
ready-made PKI framework thereby mitigating the risks of fraud stemming
from the technical aspects of the PKI framework (such as the choice of
algorithms), it is possible to conclude that the weakest link in the chain of
81 This point was also raised in Low, above n 5.
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components is the human component. As such, this article recommends the
following:
• that NECS investigate strategies to ensure that users will keep their
private key safe, as well as correct use of passwords;
• that NECS consider implementing internal control policies to prevent
internal fraud. Education and training could form a component of this
strategy;
• that if NECS uses ABN-DSC digital certificates, it should investigate
ways to ensure that standard certificates are correctly issued, and how
liability should be apportioned if fraud is perpetrated due to the
incorrect issuing of standard certificates.
7 Conclusion
In concluding, the following observation is apt:
PKI technology is complex and difficult to grasp. As with any other technology used
to provide security, the assurance provided by a PKI will be only as good as the
practices and procedures of the users and administrators who maintain the system on
a daily basis. For example, if administrators do not properly configure and maintain
the PKI software and hardware, vulnerabilities may be exposed that an attacker
could exploit. Likewise, if users do not properly safeguard their private keys, or do
not know how to properly interact with the PKI functions in their application
software, other vulnerabilities will be opened for potential exploitation . . . Even a
very well-designed and implemented PKI will lose its effectiveness if users do not
properly safeguard their private keys . . . As a result, each agency implementing and
deploying a PKI must ensure that appropriate training and support is available for
management, staff, and users throughout the life of the project.82
It describes the complexity involved in using PKI; the complexity of which
the NECS and its users would be faced with by replacing handwritten
signatures with digital signatures. This complexity, as this article has shown,
stems from the fact that digital signatures require a variety of components in
order for a digital signature to be generated; components of which handwritten
signatures do not require. The quote also shows the two aspects to security —
the technical and the human. This paper has found that digital signatures may
in fact offer greater security than handwritten signatures, if all components,
both from the technical and human aspect, are properly implemented and
managed.
Using the gatekeeper PKI framework gives NECS an assurance of security
for the technical components of PKI. To complete this, it is recommended that
NECS investigate appropriate strategies to close security weaknesses from the
user end of PKI, that is, the safety of the private key and the registration
process to use NECS and the process for issuing standard certificates.
82 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, ‘Information Security:
Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure Technology’,
GAO-01-277, 2001, p 51.
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